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BARBARA COSENS*

Resolving Conflict in Non-Ideal,
Complex Systems: Solutions for the
Law-Science Breakdown in
Environmental and Natural
Resource Law
ABSTRACT
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a consolidated case
concerning the scope of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers'
jurisdictionto requirepermitsfor dredge andfill of wetlands under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, issuing a plurality, two
concurrences, and two dissents. Each opinion has a solid legal
foundation, yet none truly makes sense if the science of the resource
in question is considered. The opinions in Rapanos v. United
States illuminate the struggle at the law-science interface. The
problem is not due to either a failure in legal reasoningor a failure
in scientific methodology if each is viewed in isolation. Instead, the
difficulty lies in the complexity that resultswhen the human system
is overlainon the environment and in ourfailure to accountfor that
complexity in the methods that govern natural resources dispute
resolution. The primary purpose of this article is to shift the
dialoguefrom its currentbifurcatedfocus on better scienceor better
laws to a focus on the need for a new, integrated approachat the
law-science interface. The article concludes by recommending one
such approach,based on the experienceof the Coloradowater courts,
that would involve the designation of specialized federal district
courts with scientists on staff.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a consolidated case
concerning the scope of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction to
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require permits for the dredging and filling of wetlands under section 4041
of the Clean Water Act. 2 The opinions issued in Rapanos v. United States
include a plurality, two concurrences, and two dissents. Each opinion has
a solid legal foundation in the methodology chosen to reach its conclusion.
Yet none makes sense if the science of the resource in question is
considered.
The struggle at the law-science interface illustrated by the Rapanos
case cannot be attributed to either a failure in legal reasoning or a failure in
scientific methodology if each is viewed in isolation. Instead, the problem
lies in the complexity prevalent in natural systems compounded by the
complexity at the interface between law and science - i.e., the overlay of the
human system on the environment- and our failure to account for that
complexity in either legal procedure or scientific methodology.
This problem is not new to those who study the natural sciences.
Scientists have long recognized the increasing complexity and lack of
predictability that occurs as studies move from controlled experiments in
the laboratory to observation of natural systems.3 Ways of thinking about
these complex, so-called non-ideal systems may help make sense of the
added complexity that emerges when the legal system is overlain onto
natural systems and may yield an initial understanding of the law-science
interface as a complex, non-ideal system itself. This understanding can
inform efforts to develop institutions more appropriately designed to
address and resolve disputes in environmental and natural resource law.
The first step in understanding the complexity at the law-science
interface is to understand that the science of natural systems is itself
complex. This article begins by discussing the range of scientific disciplines
from those reflecting "pure science," using physical chemistry as an
example, to those requiring an understanding of non-ideal, complex
systems such as geology and biology. The overlay of social systems such as
law not only adds an additional degree of uncertainty, unpredictability, and
unreplicability, but also interacts with the natural system in a way that
renders solutions from a single discipline, either law or science, inadequate.4

1.
2.

33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
3. NATL ACAD. OF SCIS., NAT'L ACAD. OF ENG'G & INST. OF MED. OF NATL AcADS.,
FACILITATING INTERDISCIPLNARY RESEARCH 32-33 (2005) ("If science and engineering deal
with extremely complex systems, the same is true for studies of human society. How human
societies evolve, make decisions, interact, and solve problems are all matters that call for
diverse insights. Very fundamental questions are inherently complex.").
4. Although many would argue that humans are part of the natural system, humans are
considered separately here because we have developed one approach for resolving social
disputes- law -and one approach for resolving disputes concerning the state of natural
systems - science.
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The scientific search for truth in the study of complex natural
systems runs headlong into the legal search for finality, yielding legal
results that achieve neither scientific accuracy nor finality. This article uses
the case study of federal wetlands regulation to illustrate the inadequacy of
existing judicial, legislative, and agency mechanisms to provide appropriate
decision making in the face of non-ideal, complex systems in the area of
environmental and natural resource law. The article concludes with an
analysis of alternatives for better integrating science into natural resources
dispute resolution and suggests some initial steps for going forward.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ISSUES AS
NON-IDEAL, COMPLEX SYSTEMS
The laws of thermodynamics predict that chemical systems will
conserve energy and tend toward increasing disorder.' Thus, chemicals,
when mixed together, will form new compounds in a lower energy state. In
what is referred to by physical chemists as an "ideal system," all things
achieve equilibrium-a final state with the lowest possible energy.6 By
assuming an ideal system, physical chemists can develop mathematical
equations to predict the results of reactions between different chemical
combinations, and the product can be shown to be repeatable in controlled
experiments.
This is the nature of the hard sciences. Outcomes can be predicted
by simple rules reflected in mathematical equations.7 Experiments in

5. That energy can be converted from one form to another but cannot be created or
lost- i.e., is conserved - is the first law of thermodynamics. See, e.g., NIcHoLASW. TSCHOEGAL,
FUNDAMENTALS OF EQUILIBRIUM AND STEADY-STATE THERMODYNAMICS (2000) (that the
entropy, or disorder, of a system will increase over time if no energy is added is the second
law of thermodynamics).
6. See, e.g., id.
7. For another discussion of the differences between hard and soft sciences by a legal
scholar, see, for example, David E. Adelman, The Art ofthe Unsolvable:Locating the Vital Center
of Science for Environmental Law and Policy (draft paper prepared for Law, Science and the
Environment Conference, Lewis and Clark Law School, 2007), http://www.lclark.edu/dept/
elaw/2007_lse._papers.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
As prefigured above, the simple answer is that the power of science depends
on the nature of the problem and the strength of the tools available to
analyze it. Good science ranges from the highly precise and accurate
methods found in the hard sciences (e.g., Newtonian physics) to heuristic
models that expose general patterns in complex systems (e.g., ecology).
Science is thus inherently pluralistic, as the different scientific disciplines
attest, and a unitary conception of environmental science is neither a
desirable end nor a viable goal.
Id. at 2 (citations omitted). See also Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource
Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 298 (2005) ("With the right
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controlled environments are replicable. But to the scientist who studies
natural systems - e.g., the geologist, the ecologist, the social scientist - this
approach is far from "ideal." Natural systems display states that are
repeated over and over again in different settings that cannot be predicted
by the laws of thermodynamics and the assumption of ideality. Examples
range from the uniform relation between the geometry of pool/riffle
sequences and meanders and the width of a river,8 to the repeated
occurrence of so-called metastable mineral sequences in geothermal
systems9 and ore bodies, ° to life." As a result, although natural systems can
be described and compared with accuracy, the predictability of future
behavior is far more uncertain. This leads to much softer answers and
greater disagreement within the discipline on exactly what those answers
should be. 2 This is the nature of complexity.

equipment, the speed of light, the pull of gravity, and the atomic weight of hydrogen, for
instance, can all be measured to a very high degree of both precision and accuracy. Biological
phenomena, even at the level of a single organism, are more complicated, more variable, and
therefore inherently more difficult to obtain highly certain information about. Moving to the
community or ecosystem level adds yet another level of variability. Unlike some physical
scientists, conservation scientists often cannot, as a practical matter, test their hypotheses
under closely controlled laboratory conditions. They must rely upon observations of the
natural world which are both difficult to make and subject to a high degree of background
variation in order to try to understand complex biological processes. Under those
circumstances, while a very strong consensus may develop around the existence and general
outline of general principles such as heredity or evolution, science may never produce
certainty about the extent, or even the existence, of causal relationships between ecosystem
decline and specific human activities.").
8. Luna B. Leopold, Water Surface Topography in River Channels and Implications for
Meander Development, in GRAVEL-BED RIVERS 59-87 (R.D. Hey ed., 1982), availableat http://
eps.berkeley.edu/people/lunaleopold/(137)%2Water%2Surface%2OTopography%20in
%20River%20Channels%20and%201mplications%20for%2OMeander%2ODevelopment.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Shang J. Yao & Bruno J. Zwolinski, Studies on Rates of Nonequilibrium
Processes, in 21 ADVANCES INCHEMICAL PHYSICS: CHEMICAL DYNAMICS: PAPERS INHONOR OF
HENRY ERYING, pt. 2, at 91 (2007), availableat http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/
bookhome/114180975/Productlnformation.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2008); Barbara Cosens
Gallinatti, Initiation and Collapse of Active Circulation in a Hydrothermal System at the MidAtlantic Ridge, 23'N, 89 J.GEOPHYSICAL RES. 3275 (1984).
10. See, e.g., P.B. Redmond et al., Copper Deposition by Fluid Cooling in Intrusion-Centered
Systems: New Insightsfrom the Bingham Porphyry OreDeposit, 32 UTAH GEOLOGY 217-20 (2004);
G.H. Brimhall, EarlyFracture-ControlledDisseminatedMineralizationatButte, Montana,72ECON.
GEOLOGY 37-59 (1977).
11. See generally E.O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNnTY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998).
12. For additional discussion of this by a legal scholar with a biology background, see
Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource
Regulation, 28th Annual Public Land Law Conference: Science and Democracy in Public Land
Conflict:Forest, Fish, and Fire, 26 PuB. LAND& REsOuRCESL. REV. 1,18 (2004) ("First, as sensible
ecologists have constantly warned, ecology and the related biological sciences will never
reach the precision and elegance of physics and mathematics.").
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In addition to the complexity resulting from the sheer number of
variables, the difficulty with predicting system behavior through synthesis
from a reductionist understanding of the components is that it builds from
the assumption of ideal behavior. Ideal behavior assumes no interaction
between components. In other words, the assumption is that the behavior
observed in isolation will remain unchanged in the face of greater
complexity. Yet those who use empirical methods to study natural systems
have found that it is often the interactions among components that define
the system. This is the very premise of the field of ecology.13
Take, for example, a river. Mathematical descriptions of fluid flow
in an ideal system assume no friction. Yet anyone who has run a river
knows that it is the edge effects that define the flow: the turbulence around
a boulder or fallen log, the riffles over a gravel bed, the eddy on the inside
of a curve. It turns out that friction, the component missing in ideal fluid
flow, defines a river. Thus, mathematical modeling of river flow includes
a term for friction. 4 The sediment load of a river adds even greater
complexity to defining river flow and channel morphology, requiring the
addition of yet another disciplinary component. 5 The study of a river
becomes even more complex when its development is viewed in a longer
timeframe in which tectonics may play a role in shaping its morphology. 6
Finally, no one who has observed the channelization, damming, and
development of our great rivers can ignore the impact of human
17
intervention.
Fossil hydrothermal systems provide another example. At
moderate temperatures, the flow of fluid through fractures in rock will
interact to alter the mineral composition of the rock. In an ideal system, the
reactions will go to equilibrium and the resulting mineral assemblage is
predictable.' 8 But in a real system, fluid flow is often faster than the rate of
chemical exchange between rock and water; thus, the system will not have
time to achieve equilibrium. 9 The addition of kinetic information -i.e.,

13.

See, e.g., J.DAVID

ALLEN, STREAM ECOLOGY: STRUCrURE AND FUNCTION OF RUNNING

WATER (1995).
14. VEN TE CHOW ET AL., APPLIED HYDROLOGY 272-73,304 (1998) (the term for friction is
in the St. Venant equations used to handle river flow).

15.
in

See, e.g., W.E. Dietrich et al., Sediment Patches,Sediment Supply andChannel Morphology,

RIVER, COASTAL AND ESTUARINE: MORPHODYNAMICS (RCEM 79-90) (G. Parker & M.H.

Garcia eds., 2005).

16. See, e.g., C. Paola et al., Toward a Unified Science of the Earth'sSurface: Opportunitiesfor
Synthesis Among Hydrology, Geomorphology, Geochemistry, and Ecology, 42 WATER RESOURCES
RES. W03S10, doi:10.1029/2005WR004336 (2006).
17. See, e.g., JEFFREY MOUNT, CALIFORNIA RIVERSANDSTREAMS (1995); W.E. Dietrich & J.T.
Perron, The Searchfora Topographic Signatureof Life, 439 NATURE 411 (2006).
18. Gallinatti, supra note 9, at 3275.
19. Id.
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information on the rate at which a particular reaction at a particular
temperature will occur -to a model of that water-rock interaction vastly
improves the predictability of the intermediate or "metastable" results.2'
However, simply adding kinetic information to a model built from a
reductionist understanding of the system will not result in the repeated
occurrence of the same metastable minerals observed over and over again
in different natural systems that could not possibly have had the exact same
rate of fluid flow. Could it be that some other factor defined by the very
nature of the interaction between rock and moving water determines the
outcome? 2' It is the possibility, in fact the belief by some, that interactions
define natural systems that has led to the development of new disciplines,
such as ecology, at the point of interaction, rather than disciplines based on
synthesis within the hard sciences.
These examples of complexity and non-ideal behavior at the
intersection between system components should not be unfamiliar to the
reader who studies the law. The very need for law rests on the complexity
of human interaction. A single human alone on an island needs no law. It
is the determination of the rights of one human being or group relative to
those of another that gives rise to civil law. Rarely are the facts of a legal
dispute identical to one that has already been decided, yet often lawyers can
predict the outcome of a new case based on the similarity of key controlling
features to those of prior cases.

20. See, e.g., N. Shikazona, Water-Rock Interaction and Mass Transfer in Hydrothermal
Systems: Kinetics, Fluid Flow, and Mixing Model, 833 AIP CoNF. PRoc. 125-28 (2006).
21. This has also been referred to as a problem of scale. David Adelman notes:
Simon Levin, an ecological modeler and theorist, describes this approach
with characteristic clarity:
"This is the principal technique of scientific inquiry: by changing
the scale of description, we move from unpredictable, unrepeatable individual cases to collections of cases whose behavior is
regular enough to allow generalizations to be made. In so doing,
we trade off the loss of detail or heterogeneity within a group for
the gain of predictability; we thereby extract and abstract those
fine-scale features that have relevance for the phenomena
observed on other scales."
One implication of this approach is that not all levels of abstraction for
analyzing a problem are created equal. Just as it would be foolish to try to
study the behavior of a gas by attempting to follow the motion of every
single gas molecule, so too may it be futile to attempt to understand
biodiversity by tracking populations of individual species. Consideration of
scale matters for basic scientific understanding and for very practical
problems of effective environmental management. In fact, the two are
closely linked because identification of strong associations (i.e., patterns)
through basic scientific work makes environmental management possible.
Adelman, supra note 7, at 8.
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The law provides this degree of certainty and predictability as a
result of social contract, not natural law. Yet it nevertheless mimics the
behavior of complex natural systems in which multiple variables must be
sorted and weighed to determine their importance to the future activity of
the system. Quite possibly, it is this similarity that has led us to erroneously
conclude that the same process used to resolve disputes between human
beings can be used when those disputes concern natural systems. Those
involved in the legal system are not alone in making this error.
Within the vast field and number of disciplines we thus refer to as
"science," some individuals have sought a unifying theory that will allow
for predictability in all systems. 2 E.O. Wilson writes of the inception of this
effort, stating,
The dream of intellectual unity first came to full flower in the
original Enlightenment, an Icarian flight of the mind that
spanned the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A vision
of secular knowledge in the service of human rights and
human progress, it was the West's greatest contribution to
civilization. It launched the modem era for the whole world;
we are all its legatees. Then it failed.'
Modem scholars engaged in the study of complex systems attribute this
failure to the dismissal of complexity as a key component of the system. 24
In contrast to the search for unity, the vast majority of scientists
since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have sought replicable and
predictable behavior in systems through reductionism - breaking those
systems into their component parts. 25 Those scientists coming from a
disciplinary world in which reductionism prevails often attempt to describe
and predict behavior in more complex systems through synthesis.26 Thus,
to understand an organism, it is built from the cell up.27 To understand the
interaction between the human and natural world, we would study each in
isolation and then attempt to bring those separate understandings to bear

22. WILSON, supra note 11, at 15. "Consilience," as used by Wilson, describes a unified
theory across the natural and social sciences and, in his words, means " [1]iterally a 'jumping
together' of knowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to
create a common groundwork of explanation." Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 15.
24. See, e.g., Sharachchandra ILs4 & Richard B. Norgaard, PracticingInterdisciplinarity,55
BIOSCIENCE 967 (2005) ("Disagreements within the social sciences, however, are therefore
extremely deep-rooted, in part because of a mistaken belief (left over from 19th-century
physics) that social phenomena ought to be explained, or largely explained, by a few
universal principles.").
25. WILSON, supra note 11, ch. 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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on the resolution of a single environmental problem. As Wilson points out,
"The greatest obstacle to consilience by synthesis.. .is the exponential
increase in complexity encountered during the upward progress through
levels of organization."' The advent of high speed computing has made it
easier to describe complex systems with multiple variables, but as any
modeler of climate change knows, the whole is not merely the sum of the
parts.
Just like the natural sciences, natural resources law suffers from the
failure of synthesis to accurately represent the behavior of the system. Thus,
a legal approach that makes sense based on an understanding of formal
rules of statutory construction fails to take into account the complexity of
the ecosystem that is subject to competing demands.
Another reason why the current legal process for dispute resolution
is inadequate when applied to natural systems is that the legal system and
the science of natural systems serve two different masters. In simple terms,
science is a search for the truth, whereas litigation is a search for finality.
Scientific inquiry has no statute of limitations, no concept of res judicata.
Scientific methodology is a process of disproving what we formerly thought
to be true, of re-investigating questions thought solved, of re-interpreting
information in light of new discoveries.29 In contrast, civil litigation is
designed to close the book on a dispute, to provide a forum where, no
matter how flawed the inquiry might be, we can achieve peaceful final
resolution of conflict.
In environmental and natural resource disputes, finality serves
those with economic interests in the resource, whereas science serves those
concerned with sustaining the resource itself. The fact that one side of the
litigation equation in a typical environmental or natural resource dispute
seeks a goal that is not served by the forum provided helps explain why
these disputes often face endless gridlock within the judicial system or,
alternatively, once the judicial system provides a seemingly final answer,
are revisited in the legislature.
When we consider both the different disciplinary goals and
techniques of law and science and the increased complexity at the
intersection, it becomes clear that understanding the complex behavior in
this non-ideal system may require a new way of thinking and a new forum
for resolving disputes where these disciplines intersect. It is the possibility
that a new understanding of the interface between law and science can
improve our approach to dispute resolution in the environment and natural
resource areas that is the basis for this article. This is the view that substance
matters, that our institutions, including agencies and the judiciary, must

28.
29.

Id. at 91.
See, e.g., Peter Kosso, Scientific Understanding,12 FOuND. So. 173 (2007).
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adapt to the subject matter at hand.' One author alluded to this concept in
criticizing the handling of a case about climate change by stating:
Long ago, Hamilton argued in The FederalistNo. 78 that their
inability to apply force or will- leaving the courts with only
their "judgment" -would make the judiciary the "least
dangerous branch." He did not foresee how scientific
questions could eventually so dominate American public life
as to render the rule of law essentially irrelevant to, for
example, the biggest environmental problem confronting
humanity in the twenty-first century. He did not foresee, that
is, the danger of judicial power rendering itself impotent and
trapped within its own trumped-up structure.31
The following case study illustrates the breakdown that occurs when
science and the law are merely combined with no accommodation for the
complexity of the interaction.
III. CASE STUDY: THE LAW-SCIENCE INTERFACE IN FEDERAL
WETLANDS REGULATION
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a consolidated case 32
concerning the scope of the jurisdiction of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
require permits for the dredging and filling of wetlands under section 40433

30. One author notes that this adaptation is already occurring in endangered species law,
stating,
Law, acting alone, would never have produced the process rules the court
devised for critical habitat in the Homebuilderscase. Neither would science
on its own have led to them. Rather, the law-science process of the ESA, as
in other environmental law programs, is an emergent property. Law and
science have mingled under the ESA for almost 35 years. The result is a
process that does not make complete sense to any lawyer wearing only a law
hat, or to any scientist wearing only a science hat. That is to say, the ESA's
law-science process cannot be understood through the reductionist lens of
law or science alone. It has properties that do not exist in law alone or in
science alone, therefore it no longer makes sense to evaluate the ESA strictly
from the perspective of legal process or of science process.
J.B. Ruhl, The Co-evolution of Environmental Science and EnvironmentalLaw (paper prepared for
Law, Science and the Environment Conference, Lewis and Clark Law School, 2007), http://
www.lclark.edu/dept/elaw/2007_lse--papers.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
31. Jamison Colburn, No Time Like the Present:The Eighteenth-CenturyJudicialPower Meets
the Twenty-first-Century Problem in Massachusetts v. EPA, 38 TRENDS (ABA Section on Env't,
Energy & Resources), Mar./Apr. 2007, at 4.
32. The two cases, both from the Sixth Circuit, were Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629
(2004), and Carabellv. United States, 391 F.3d 704 (2005). The consolidated case is referred to
as Rapanos.
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
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of the Clean Water Act. 4 The Rapanos case raised the same question that
continues to plague courts dealing with natural resources issues: where
does the law end and the science begin and who decides? The opinions in
Rapanos include a plurality, two concurrences, and two dissents. Each
opinion is based on a solid legal foundation. However, even though the
subject matter of the dispute-water quality-is an area infused with
science, none of the five opinions is grounded in a scientific understanding
of the resource at issue. In fact, each opinion is sufficiently divorced from
the science as to make subsequent implementation extremely difficult.
Much has been written about the law-science dilemma, and efforts
35
have been made to address it. Most of these have focused on the science
or the need for transparency in science policy. 36 While these are useful
beginnings, none resolve the problem presented by Rapanos: if all five U.S.
Supreme Court opinions addressing an area in which science is needed to
develop and implement the law are completely valid as a legal matter yet
have no meaning when the science addressing the resource is considered,
then something is wrong with the legal methodology chosen to resolve
disputes at the law-science interface in environmental and natural resource
law.
This section will discuss the legal background leading to Rapanos,
the scientific understanding of the relation between wetlands and water
quality, and, finally, the five Rapanos opinions to illustrate both the validity
of the legal reasoning and the absence of any relation between that
reasoning and the science.

34. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
35. See, e.g., Information Quality Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2000); Kirk O'Reilly, Science,
Policy, and Politics:The Impact of the Information QualityAct on Risk-Based RegulatoryActivity at
the EPA, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 249 (2007).
36. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & J. Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L.
REv. 1, 10 (2006) (In discussing the need for peer review, the authors state, "The standard
argument that agencies must make policy decisions in the face of incomplete and uncertain
scientific data, and thus should not be bound to the rigors of peer review, turns the issue on
its head. Designed wisely, regulatory peer review can help reveal how much scientific
uncertainty underlies an agency decision and can thus demand that the agency explain how
the gap was filled."); Doremus, supra note 7, at 253 ("The core of the problem is not the
involvement of politics but its concealment behind a cloak of science."); Wendy E. Wagner,
The Science Charadein Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1617 (1995) ("Although
camouflaging controversial policy decisions as science assists the agency in evading various
political, legal, and institutional forces, doing so ultimately delays and distorts the standardsetting mission, leaving in its wake a dysfunctional regulatory program.").
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A. The Law: Pre-Rapanos Wetlands Regulation
The Clean Water Act (CWA)37 begins with the ambitious goal "to

restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." To accomplish this goal, the CWA, among other things,
prohibits both "discharge of any pollutant,"' defined as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters,"' except as permitted by the CWA and
"discharge of dredge or fill material into the navigable waters"' except as
permitted by the CWA. The CWA defines the "navigable waters" to which it
applies as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."41
The CWA assigns authority for discharge permits42 and oversight
of state programs4 3 to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) but
grants the Corps of Engineers jurisdiction over dredge and fill permits,"
consistent with its area of authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899. 4' The legal scope of jurisdiction of the two agencies is constrained at
two levels: (1) by the authority of Congress to act in a particular area as set
forth in the U.S. Constitution and (2) by the intent of Congress to assign
jurisdiction to the agencies as set forth in the Clean Water Act. Although
numerous challenges to the constitutionality of the scope of agency
jurisdiction under the CWA have been raised, the U.S. Supreme Court has
so far restricted its rulings to the intent of Congress under the CWA.'

37. Formally known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2000).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).
39. Id. § 1362(12)(A). The full text of the definition is as follows:
The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term "discharge of pollutants"
each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to any waters of the
contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or
other floating craft.
Id. The definition of and debate over the meaning of "navigable waters" in this definition are
the focus of Rapanos.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). Although the CWA is primarily implemented by the EPA,
the dredge and fill portions of the Act are administered by the Army Corps of Engineers, 33
U.S.C. § 1344(d) (2000), for reasons of history discussed below.
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
42. Id. § 1342.
43. Id. § 1342(b).
44. Id. § 1344.
45. Id. § 401 et seq.
46. For a general treatment of the pre-Rapanosagency and court actions, see Donna M.
Downing et al., NavigatingThrough Clean WaterAct Jurisdiction:A Legal Review, 23 WETLANDS
475 (2003). Not only is the article a good overview of the sequence of events, but, because it
is authored by legal counsel to the EPA and the Corps of Engineers, it also provides insight
into possible agency interpretation of those events.
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The Corps' initial definition of "waters of the United States" limited
its jurisdiction to navigable waters or those waters susceptible to use in
interstate commerce.47 In response to a legal challenge, in 1975 the Corps
issued regulations revising its definition of the waters covered by the CWA
to include tributaries to navigable waters and all wetlands adjacent to
covered waters." Thus, at the time of the first major challenge to Corps
jurisdiction over wetlands under the CWA, Corps regulations defined
"wetlands" as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas."49
In a challenge to the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over the filling
of wetlands located adjacent to a navigable lake and formed by saturation
from ground water, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Sixth Circuit's ruling restricting the CWA's jurisdiction to marshes formed
by frequent flooding from adjacent navigable waters.' The primary legal
principle on which the Court based its opinion was deference to the
reasonable interpretation of the expert agency given the scientific nature of
the question of where "waters ends and land begins.""1 The Court found the
interpretation by the Corps to be reasonable because of the legislative
history recognizing the complexity of the hydrologic cycle and its function
in water quality and the Corps' acknowledgement of the scientific relation
between wetlands and the water quality of adjacent water bodies through
filtration and reduction in flooding and erosion. 2 The Court left open the
question of jurisdiction over wetlands that are not adjacent to navigable
waters and their tributaries.5 3
This opening became the focus of the next round of litigation. In
Solid WasteAgency of Northern Cook County v. United States (SWANCC), Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-person majority, found that "isolated

47. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
48. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July
25, 1975) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209). Note that in 1979 Attorney General Civiletti
issued an opinion determining that the EPA is the agency with the authority under the CWA
to define waters of the United States, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 197 (1979), and the agencies now
provide consistent regulations pursuant to EPA, Memorandum of Agreement,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/404f.html (last visited Apr. 23,2008).
49. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1978).
50. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1985).
51. Id. at 132.
52. Id. at 133-34.
53. Id. at 124 n.2.
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wetlands" were outside the CWA jurisdiction of the Corps.54 Language
asserting jurisdiction over "isolated wetlands," or those wetlands not
adjacent to navigable waters or their tributaries, had been included in
preambles to both EPA and Corps regulations, which stated,
"Waters of the United States" typically include the following
waters:
- Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected
by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
- Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross State lines; or
- Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered
species; or
- Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.,55
The Corps had asserted its authority over the isolated wetlands at
issue in SWANCC based on their use by migratory birds. The legal
methodology used by the court in rejecting this jurisdiction was twofold.
First, while the Court acknowledged that in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc. it interpreted the definition of "navigable waters" in the
CWA as "waters of the United States" to include more than traditional
navigable waters, the Court stated that it could not read the term
"navigable" entirely out of the CWA.56 The Court stated that "[i ] t was the
significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes."5 7 Thus, the
Court interpreted the text of the CWA itself to determine the intent of
Congress rather than the legislative history relied on in Riverside Bayview.
Second, the Court refused to grant deference to the agency
interpretation of an ambiguous statute in this case, finding that such
deference was inappropriate when the agency interpretation might raise
constitutional issues.58 The Court identifies this as both a "prudential"
concern to avoid unnecessarily addressing constitutional issues and a

54. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
[hereinafter SWANCC].
55. Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exceptions; Section 404
State Program Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,764, 20,765 (June 6, 1988) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 232-233) (EPA clarification); Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206-217 (Nov. 13,1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320-330)
(Corps clarification). Although broader in scope than implied and not actually a regulation,
this language is generally referred to as the Migratory Bird Rule. See, e.g., Downing et al.,
supra note 46, at 483.
56. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 172.
57. Id. at 167.
58. Id. at 172.
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federalism concern to exercise caution where a federal-state balance has
been established in the regulation of an area formerly left to the states.5 9
Unfortunately, while these decisions are defensible and arguably
compatible on legal grounds, neither of them provides helpful guidance to
the agency scientists who must implement the CWA. Agency scientists
appear to have focused on the "substantial nexus" language emphasized by
the SWANCC Court to provide a basis for developing an approach that
could be scientifically defended by focusing on the relation between the
particular wetland and the water quality of a navigable water." This brings
us to the relevant science.
B. The Science: Wetlands and Water Quality
As noted above, EPA regulations define wetlands for purposes of
the CWA as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas. "61 From the perspective
of the wetland specialist, it is the plant, animal, and soil characteristics of a
particular area as well as the frequency of saturation that delineate the
wetland, not the continuous presence of surface water, as the Rapanos court
ultimately based its decision on.62 Wetlands in the United States fall into the
following four categories: marshes, swamps, bogs, and fens.' 3
Wetlands can be thought of as the transition zone between land and
water.' Similar to other ecological transition zones, wetlands are
biologically rich and diverse, including elements of both zones and their
own unique biota that are adapted to live in a frequently changing system.'

59. Id. at 172-73.
60. See, e.g., Downing et al., supra note 46, at 492 ("It is this question-the 'significant
nexus' between an intrastate non-navigable 'isolated' water and the rest of the aquatic
ecosystem-that will likely determine whether the water will be protected by the CWA.");
Scott G. Leibowitz, Isolated Wetlands and Their Functions: An Ecological Perspective, 23
WETLANDS 517, 526 (2003).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (2008).
62. LEwis M. COWARDIN ET AL., CLAssIFIcATION oF WETLANDS AND DEEPWATER HABrrATS
1 (FWS/OBS-79/31,1979), http://www.fws.gov/nwi/PubsReports/ClassManual/class_
titlepg.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2008).
63. EPA, EPA 843-F-04-011a, WETLANDS OVERVIEW (2004), available at http://www.
epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/overview.pdf.
64. COWARDIN Er AL., supra note 62, at 3.
65. EPA, EPA 843-F-01-002c, FuNCTIONS AND VALUES OF WETLANDS (2001) [hereinafter
FUNCTIONS AND VALUES], available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/funval.pdf; see also EPA, What Are Wetlands?, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/
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According to the EPA, wetlands cover five percent of the surface area of the
coterminous United States, yet they are home to 31 percent of the plant
species. 66 But beyond the ecological richness of the habitat, wetlands
perform two important functions that render them relevant in a discussion
of water quality.
First, due to their proximity to bodies of water, wetlands serve as
storage areas in times of high water, both slowing the movement of surface
water to a water body and providing overflow when that water body
floods.67 To humans, this function is important both for considerations of
flood control and for sediment transport into waterways. One study
concluded that restoration of the 100-year floodplain in the Upper
Mississippi River basin would allow storage of 39 million acre-feet of
water - enough to prevent the floods of 1993 and the resulting roughly $16
billion in damage.'
Second, in the process of slowing the movement of runoff from land
to a water body and thus allowing suspended sediment to drop out of the
water column, wetlands perform a filtration function.69 This may be aided
by the abundance of peat-like material in certain types of wetlands. Similar
to a manufactured water filter, this carboniferous layer of material may
absorb contaminants such as heavy metals and thus prevent them from
entering the water body.
Although scientists may agree that wetlands as a whole perform
these functions, the values of an individual wetland may vary. 70 Because
wetlands fall on a continuum between continuous and intermittent
flooding,' and range in latitude from the tropics to the tundra, 2 the
delineation and water quality value of an individual wetland are likely to
vary among experts.
The term "isolated wetland" used in SWANCC is not a scientifically
defined term.73 It is true that wetlands may be isolated geographically,

nature.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2008).
66.

FUNCToNs AND VALUES, supra note 65.

67. Id.
68.

EPA, EPA 843-F-06-001, WETLANDS: PROTECTINGLIFE AND PROPERTYFROM FLOODING

(2006), availableat http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/Flooding.pdf.
69. FuNcIONS AND VALUES, supra note 65.
70. Id.
71. COWARDIN Er AL., supra note 62, at 3.
72. EPA, Wetlands Definitions, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/what/definitions.
html (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
73. Ralph W. Tiner, GeographicallyIsolated Wetlands ofthe United States, 23 WETLANDS 494,
494 (2003); Leibowitz, supranote 60, at 517-18.
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meaning the wetland is completely surrounded by uplands. 74 However,
although geographically isolated wetlands may lack apparent surface water
connections to a water body, hydrologic connections through ground water
or intermittent flooding by surface water may still exist. 75 The degree of
connection to other water bodies through ground water will depend on the
nature of the underlying substrate, among other factors, and thus will be
unique to the particular wetland and potentially difficult to evaluate.76
Ecological isolation is a concept disfavored by scientists both because
ecologists consider all biota connected at some level' and because dispersal
of organisms between wetlands may occur through mechanisms other than
a surface water connection. 78
Geographically isolated wetlands may still perform important
water quality functions; however, few studies have addressed this issue, 79
and most articles on the subject merely draw the inference that a water
quality link will exist when hydrologic connection exists.80 Some studies
suggest that isolated wetlands may perform an important role in uptake of
phosphorus and in denitrification. 8' More information is available on the
continued importance of some geographically isolated wetlands in flood
control. 82 This absence of data on the relation between certain types of
wetlands and water quality despite over 30 years of implementation of the
CWA is symptomatic of one of the major disconnects between law and
science - our failure to take opportunities to learn, which will be discussed
further in section IV.
Given the tension between the scientific fact that wetlands exist on
a complex continuum between a clear surface water connection and
geographic isolation and the legal principles developed in Riverside Bayview
and SWANCC, it is not surprising that the next challenge to reach the U.S.

74. In technical terms, to be surrounded by uplands can be identified by such features
as "hydrophytic plant communities surrounded by terrestrial plant communities or undrained
hydric soils surrounded by nonhydric soils." Tiner, supranote 73, at 495; Leibowitz, supra note
60, at 518.
75. Tiner, supra note 73, at 495; Leibowitz, supra note 60, at 518-19.
76. Tiner, supra note 73, at 495; Leibowitz, supra note 60, at 518-19; Thomas C. Winter &
James W. LaBaugh, Hydrologic Considerationsin Defining Isolated Wetlands, 23 WETLANDS 532,
534-35 (2003).
77. Tiner, supra note 73.
78. Leibowitz, supra note 60, at 519.
79. Id. at 521-22.
80. Dennis F. Whigham & Thomas E. Jordan, Isolated Wetlands and Water Quality,23
WETLANDS 541, 543, 547 (2003).
81. Barbara L. Bedford & Kevin S. Godwin, Fens of the United States: Distribution,
Characteristics,and Scientific Connection Versus Legal Isolation, 23 WETLANDS 608, 621 (2003).
82. See Tiner, supra note 73, at 498.

Spring 2008]

RESOLVING CONFLICTIN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

273

Supreme Court focused on a wetland with an unclear surface water
connection. We now turn to Rapanos.
C. Rapanos: The Law-Science Trainwreck
On June 19, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinions in
Rapanos v. United States' after failing to achieve a majority opinion. This
section will briefly describe the facts underlying the consolidated cases and
then analyze the legal methodology relied on by each of the five opinions.
1. The Factual Setting8
In the words of Justice Scalia, "In these consolidated cases, we
consider whether four Michigan wetlands, which lie near ditches or manmade drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters
constitute 'waters of the United States' within the meaning of the Act."'
A more detailed description of the wetlands in question can be
gleaned from the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy. In the first
consolidated case, developer John Rapanos began filling three wetlands
without a permit after being told that one would be necessary.' These
wetlands are referred to as the "Salzburg site,"8 7 the "Hines Road site," as
and the "Pine River site." 89 Wetlands on the Salzburg parcel were found by
the district court to be hydrologically connected to tributaries to the
navigable KawKawlin River via the Hoppler Drain, and to a creek that is a
tributary to the Saginaq River, which flows into Lake Huron. 9° The district
court found the Hines Road site to have a surface water connection to the
Rose Drain, which feeds into the navigable Tittabawassee River. 91 The

83. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). The Court achieved a majority on the outcome but issued two
concurring opinions and two dissents. Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality and was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy wrote separate opinions with Kennedy concurring in the outcome. Justice Stevens
wrote a dissent joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Breyer wrote a
separate dissenting opinion.
84. In discerning the factual background from the opinions, it is worth noting that,
similar to astute law students, the authors, while each accurately stating the facts, chose those
facts that made their approach and conclusion appear most reasonable. Thus, the author of
the particular facts chosen for the purposes of this article will be noted in each instance.
85. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 729 (Scalia, J., writing for the plurality).
86. Id. at 763 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 762 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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district court found the Pine River site to have a surface water connection
to Pine River, which flows into Lake Huron.9
By contrast to the Rapanos scenario, in the other consolidated case
the Carabells sought and were denied a permit by the Corps (overriding the
decision of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality)' due to the
flood storage function of the wetlands they sought to develop.9 The
wetland in question was found by the district court to be one mile from the
navigable Lake St. Clair. A berm blocks the wetlands' surface water
connection with a ditch that empties into the Sutherland-Oemig Drain,
which flows to Auvase Creek, a tributary to Lake St. Clair. 95 A ten-year
storm will result in overflow of the berm and storage of flood waters in the
wetland.'
In his dissent, Justice Stevens provides additional information on
the values of the wetlands in question as described by the government
witness at trial. The district court had found the expert witness to be
"'highly credible,'' 97 and according to the expert's testimony, the wetland
functions at the Rapanos sites included floodwater storage, moderation of
low flows, and sediment trapping.98 Evidence presented to the district court
regarding the basis for the rejection of the Carabells' permit application
indicated that the wetland
performs both storage and filtration functions
99
during flood events.
In both cases, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Corps' jurisdiction to
require dredge and fill permits for the wetlands under section 404 of the

92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 765 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

94.

Id.

95. Id. at 764 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 04-1034, p. B7)).
98. See id.
99. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting App. in No. 04-1384, p. 127a-128a). The letter
from the Corps to the Carabells stated,
Your parcel is primarily a forested wetland that provides valuable seasonal
habitat for aquatic organisms and year round habitat for terrestrial
organisms. Additionally, the site provides water storage functions that, if
destroyed, could result in an increased risk of erosion and degradation of
water quality in the Sutherland-Oemig Drain, Auvase Creek, and Lake St.
Clair. The minimization of impacts to these wetlands is important for
conservation and the overall ecology of the region. Because the project
development area is a forested wetland, the proposed project would destroy
the resources in such a manner that they would not soon recover from
impacts of the discharges. The extent of impacts in the project area when
considered both individually and cumulatively would be unacceptable and
contrary to the public interest.
Id. at 791.
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CWA. °° The parties sought and were granted certiorari, and the cases were
consolidated. 1 1
2. The Plurality Opinion of Justice Scalia Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito and Thomas
As explained above, the Corps' jurisdiction to regulate wetlands
under the authority of the CWA is restricted at both the constitutional and
statutory levels. Just as with Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, the Rapanos
opinions were decided at and limited to the statutory level. Thus, in
determining the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction, the Court had to discern
what Congress meant when it defined "navigable waters" as "waters of the
United States. " ' °2
Justice Scalia answers this question by stating, "on its only plausible
interpretation, the phrase 'the waters of the United States' includes only
those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of
5
water 'forming geographic features'...oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.'""
Recognizing that Riverside Bayview allowed jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters, and unwilling or unable to get a majority to
overturn the prior ruling, Justice Scalia narrows that ruling by requiring
that the Corps' jurisdiction over a wetland be limited to "those wetlands
with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the
United States' in their own right."" °
Justice Scalia's sole source for the definition of "waters" as it is used
°5
The requirement of a continuous
in the CWA is Webster's Dictionary."
surface connection lacks an explanation in the text of the opinion other than
a desire to establish a clear, bright-line test. Thus, the following paragraphs

100. Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629, 643 (6th Cir. 2004); Carabell v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 391 F.3d 704, 708 (6th Cir. 2004).
101. Rapanos v. United States, 546 U.S. 932 (2005) (mem.); Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 546 U.S. 932 (2005) (mem.).
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
103. Rapanos,547 U.S. at 739 (quoting WEBSrER'S SECOND 2882).
104. Id. at 742. Presumably Scalia's "'waters of the United States' in their own right"
means navigable waters as traditionally defined; whereas "waters of the United States" as
referred to in the CWA includes these surfacially connected waters. Id.
105. Id. at 739 (quoting WEagTER'SSECOND 2882). Somewhat amusingly, Justice Scalia does
rely on one other source- the 1942 Warner Brothers classic "Casablanca" - for the proposition
that a dry desert is not water. Id. at 2218. This is fitting in that Justice Scalia's chosen
definition reflects a nineteenth-early-twentieth-century view that if you cannot see it, it is not
there. However, the millions of people now living in the southwestern United States in places
where no surface water is apparent might disagree.
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discuss both why the resort to Webster's is a valid legal approach"° and why
the chosen definition of "waters" and the requirement of a continuous
surface connection results in absolute nonsense from a scientific point of
view.
Justice Scalia is often referred to as a "textualist,"" ° even by himself,"°8 and his opinion in Rapanos is an excellent illustration of this legal
methodology. A textualist approaches legal analysis seeking a strict
interpretation of the meaning of the language Congress chose to use at the
time the statute was enacted."° While there are many legal approaches that
could be used in analyzing what is meant by "waters of the United States,"
including review of the legislative history10 and deference to the
interpretation of the agency charged with implementation (to be discussed
in the context of Justice Stevens' dissent), the textualist approach focuses
only on the language of the CWA itself."
There are four primary justifications for the use of textualism. First,
the language that ends up in the statute has been the subject of numerous
levels of policy making and review from initial drafting to committee
meetings to floor debate,1 1 2 and the legislative history is not an accurate
record of the true intent of the language because participants in the process
often shape their comments with an eye toward how they would like the
statute to be interpreted." 3 Second, citizens are entitled to notice of the laws
that govern them, particularly where, as with section 404 of the CWA,
criminal sanctions for violations are possible.' Third, limiting judicial
interpretation to the actual text limits judicial discretion to pick and choose

106. See Looking It Up: Dictionariesand Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1437,
1437-39 (1994). One author notes that while the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to dictionaries in over 600 cases over two centuries, it has dramatically increased its usage since the
mid-1980s. Id. at 1437. The author also notes that rarely before the present period did the
Court use the dictionary as the central factor in an important determination. Id. at 1439-40.
107. Ralph A. Rossum, The Textualist Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, http://salvatori.
claremontmckenna.edu/publications/RARScalia.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
108. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13
(Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
109. See id.
110. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
111. See SCALIA,supra note 108.
112. See, e.g., CHARLES W. JOHNSON, How OUR BILLS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. 108-93 (2003),
availableat http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/howourlawsaremade.pdf.
113. Looking It Up, supra note 106, at 1441-42.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000) (providing for criminal penalties); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (providing for permits for dredge and fill of wetlands and specifically noting that "the
Administrator [may] take action pursuant to section 1319 of this title"); id. § 1344(n). No
criminal actions were filed against Carabell; however, a criminal action filed separately from
this case was filed against Rapanos. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 763 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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among interpretations that fit the justices' desired outcome. 5 Finally,
where issues of federalism are concerned, states' interests are best protected
by requiring a clear statement of Congress's intent to intrude upon an area
of traditional state control." 6 Thus, despite the extensive criticism of Justice
Scalia's opinion in Rapanos," 7 it must be admitted that he relied on a
legitimate legal methodology for arriving at his conclusion. Unfortunately
for the agency scientists who must now implement the CWA, this legitimate
legal approach resulted in a meaningless conclusion from a scientific
viewpoint.
Justice Scalia's dictionary definition of "waters" and his requirement of a continuous surface water connection divorce the legal term from
the scientific reality. Scalia states that "the watercourses through which
intermittent waters typically flow.. .are, by and large, not 'waters of the
United States.""' 8 However, in addition to its ecological importance, the
value of a wetland (in fact of these particular wetlands) under the CWA is
that it stores water and sediment when flooding occurs, an event that by

115. SCALIA, supra note 108, at 13. See also Chisolm v. Roener, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Rossum, supra note 107.
116. Rapanos,547 U.S. at 738. Here, the traditional role referred to is a state's jurisdiction
over water within its territory. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705 (1978).
The federalism argument is somewhat disingenuous when applied to the situation at hand.
Most western states have laws defining "waters" or "waters subject to appropriation" to distinguish between those waters that can become an item of property and thus commerce and
those waters that cannot. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1 (1978) (defining "waters" as anything in a channel); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982) (concluding that water,
once appropriated, is an article of commerce). If the true concern is deference to states, why
not defer to their definition? Certainly, western congressional representatives of states
participating in drafting the CWA would have known of these definitions. Nevertheless, this
would not resolve the legitimate question of how a layperson is to interpret the term
"waters."
117. For example, see a series of articles on the case in volume 22 of Natural Resources &
Environment, published in 2007 by the American Bar Association. In particular, see James
Murphy, Hard to Navigate:Rapanos and the Futureof ProtectingOur Waters, 22 NAT. RESOURCES
&ENV'T 3 (2007) (referring to the case as "one of the most important, and befuddling, CWA
decisions the Court has ever issued"); Joshua A. Bloom, What's Next After Rapanos, id. at 13
("Unfortunately, the Court has done little more than muddy the waters in defining the extent
of the federal government's authority under the CWA...."); Robin Kundis Craig, Which Way
FederalismUnder Section 402 ?,id. at 20 ("The Supreme Court's decision.. .clouds the future of
the Clean Water Act's (CWA's) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System...."); W.
Parker Moore &Fred R. Wagner, A Regulatory ProposalThat Even the Supreme CourtCould Love,
id. at 34 ("It is unlikely the lower courts will be able to iron out the regulatory wrinkles left
in the wake of Rapanos."); Donna Downing et al., Technical and Scientific Challenges in Implementing Rapanos' "Water of the United States," id. at 42 (stating, " [Rapanosand SWANCC] create
new scientific and technical challenges" and "[t]he jurisdictional terms such as 'relatively
permanent' and 'significant nexus' used in the Rapanos opinion are legal concepts").
118. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 735-36.
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definition is intermittent, and filters that water as it returns to a water body
via a groundwater connection, an event that by definition occurs beneath
the surface of the ground.'19 Furthermore, very few of the water bodies in
the southwestern United States fit Justice Scalia's definition, despite the fact
that the water from them, though intermittent, is relied on for drinking
water and irrigation and bought, sold, and transferred as an article of
commerce.' 2° Thus, the charge of the CWA to agency scientists to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters"" is thwarted by the textural clarity sought by Scalia. Limiting
water quality protection to wetlands with a continuous surface connection
removes all those wetlands that provide significant water quality functions,
yet have merely intermittent or subsurface connections to water used to
meet human needs- i.e., water used in commerce. 2
None of the scientific definitions of wetlands appear to require
continuous connection to surface flow. As noted above, wetlands are
delineated by the soil and biota that result from conditions of saturation,
whether the water causing the saturation is visible or not and whether it is
surface or ground water.' 2 Of course, delineation of wetlands is not the
question in Rapanos; rather, it is what constitutes a "water of the United
States." But scientifically, a continuous surface connection does not
determine the importance of a particular wetland in the water quality of a
navigable waterway or water used in interstate commerce. Rather, the key
inquiry is the role that the wetland plays in storing floodwater and
sediment and filtering out contaminants.1 24

119. Id. at 741. Note that both scientists and lawyers have spent considerable time and
effort arguing for protection of wetlands under the CWA on ecological bases. Justice Scalia
resoundingly rejects this as an independent basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 742 (citing SWANCC,
531 U.S. at 167, 171). This article will leave the analysis of this conclusion to others.
120. A map of the eastern plateau region of Arizona shows most surface water sources,
including portions of the Little Colorado River, to be intermittent. 2 ARIzONA WATER ATLAS
50 (2006 draft), available at http://www.azwater.gov/dwr/Content/Find-by-Program/
RuralPrograms/content/water atlas/ArizonaWaterAtlasVollIntroductionDraftJune
2006.pdf. Of the 92 large reservoirs built for water use in the area, 33 are intermittent or dry.
Id. at 36.
Surface water is a municipal supply for the cities of Flagstaff and Page and
for the town of Eager in the southeastern corner of the planning area. It is
also utilized for agricultural irrigation by Indian and non-Indian users.
Surface water from the Lake Mary reservoir system is an important
municipal supply for the City of Flagstaff. Because surface water is drought
sensitive, it can be unreliable.
Id. at 15.
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
122. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 946, 949 (1982).
123. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t).
124. FUNCnONs AND VALUES, supra note 65; EPA, supra note 68.
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In denying the Corps' jurisdiction over a wetland with a "mere
hydrologic connection" to a navigable water, Scalia cites Riverside Bayview
for the proposition that drawing the line between where land begins and
water ends may, at times, be difficult."2 According to Scalia, the Court in
that case only deferred to the definition relied on by the Corps because a
wetland adjacent to a navigable water "'is itself a part of those waters.""' 26
Yet, once again, this reference to "part of those waters" has no scientific
meaning unless it is related to the ecology or the water quality of the
navigable river.
Scalia's textural response, had it garnered a majority, has all the
trappings of finality valued by the legal system. However, Scalia's failure
to account for the complexity of the natural system, and his construction of
a definition that, while clear, denies water quality protection for many
waters used for human needs, means the dispute will inevitably continue.
Whether through resort to the courts, Congress, or other non-judicial
means, those concerned with real water quality protection will continue to
pursue a remedy.
3. The Concurring Opinion of ChiefJustice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts writes a concurring opinion in Rapanosmerely
to explain his reasons for joining the plurality rather than applying the legal
methodology of deference to an agency interpretation used by Justice
Stevens in the dissent and described below.127 The basis for Chief Justice
Roberts' refusal to defer is the fact that the Corps did not change the
regulations detailing the scope of their jurisdiction after the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down the portion referred to as the "Migratory Bird Rule.""
This rationale is extremely weak as a legal matter given that the Corps'

125. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 740 (2006) (citing United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985)).
126. Id. (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132, 135 & n.9).
127. Id. at 757-36.
128. Id. As explained in the Rapanos dissent, the Corps published notice seeking comment
following SWANCC and decided not to act after 43 states and 99 percent of the comments
requested that the Corps not reduce the scope of jurisdiction. Id. at 738 n.4. However, the
Corps did direct its field staff that it could no longer assert jurisdiction over "'isolated,'
intrastate, non-navigable water bodies." Downing et al., supra note 46, at 475 (citing a Corps
of Engineers legal memorandum dated January 19, 2001). The legal memorandum was
superseded by a guidance published in the Federal Register on January 15, 2003, directing
field staff that "SWANCC squarely eliminates CWA jurisdiction over isolated waters that are
intrastate and non-navigable, where the sole basis for asserting CWA jurisdiction is the actual
or potential use of the waters as habitat for migratory birds that cross state lines in their
migrations." Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991-96 (Jan. 15, 2003) (to be codified
at 33 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 401).
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basis for asserting jurisdiction over the wetlands at issue in Rapanos and
Carabell had nothing to do with the presence of migratory birds. 9
Nevertheless, it was sufficient to persuade the Chief justice to join the
plurality, and the analysis above of that opinion's lack of scientific
grounding will not be repeated here.
4. The Concurring Opinion of Justice Kennedy
More than any of the other justices, Justice Kennedy attempts to
incorporate the science of wetlands into his legal conclusions. The legal
basis of Justice Kennedy's opinion is that the wetlands in Rapanos do not
meet the test for CWA jurisdiction established in precedent. justice
Kennedy focuses on a line from SWANCC that Chief Justice Rehnquist used
to distinguish that case from Riverside Bayview. This line, which was also
used in another context by the plurality,' 30 states, "It was the significant
nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that informed our
reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes." 13' Thus, rather than rely
on the text of the CWA as the plurality did, Justice Kennedy draws his key
language - significant nexus - from the Court's opinion interpreting the
CWA.
Justice Kennedy's approach is a legal methodology commonly used
in the interpretation of both constitutional and statutory texts. The Court
often develops an interpretive approach or test in the context of one set of
facts and then continues to refine and build on that approach as new factual
situations come before it. 13 2 What is somewhat unusual in Justice Kennedy's
application of the methodology is that "significant nexus" was not a test set
forth in Riverside Bayview. In that case the Court used the methodology
relied on by Justice Stevens in the Rapanos dissent and discussed below,
premised on deference to the interpretation of the CWA by the Corps."3
Rather than an articulated test, "significant nexus" was used by Chief

129. Justice Kennedy refers to this lack of connection between possible post-SWANCC
rulemaking and the issue in these cases by stating, "New rulemaking could have averted the
disagreement here only if the Corps had anticipated the unprecedented reading of the Act that
the plurality advances." Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 778.
130. Id. at 726 ("In SWANCC, we considered the application of the Corps' 'Migratory Bird
Rule' to 'an abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois.' 531 U.S., at 162, 121 S. Ct.
675. Observing that '[i]t was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable
waters' that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview,'id., at 167,121 S. Ct. 675
(emphasis added), we held that Riverside Bayview did not establish 'that the jurisdiction of
the Corps extends to ponds that are not adjacent to open water.' 531 U.S., at 168,121 S. Ct. 675
(emphasis deleted).").
131. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159,167 (2001) (referring to Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131-32).
132. See, e.g., AshutoshBhagwat, 7he Test That Ate Everything:IntermediateScrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence,2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783.
133. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131.
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Justice Rehnquist in SWANCC merely as a basis to distinguish the outcome
in that case from the one in Riverside Bayview. However, Justice Kennedy's
approach may be appropriate given that what the Court was called on to do
in Rapanos was to place the wetlands at issue on one side or the other of the
line between wetlands adjacent to navigable waters -jurisdiction appropriate under Riverside Bayview -and so-called "isolated wetlands"jurisdiction inappropriate under SWANCC. What better rule to use in
making that determination than the one articulated by the Court as the basis
for drawing a line between adjacent and isolated wetlands? Nevertheless,
the fact that three cases were necessary to articulate a test found nowhere
in the text of the CWA or Corps' regulations does not bode well for those
seeking predictability in the implementation of a statute. Consistent with
the legal methodology when a new test is articulated or clarified," Justice
Kennedy would remand Rapanos and Carabell to the lower court for
application of the test. 3
Justice Kennedy's concurrence goes further than any of the other
opinions in seeking to ground its legal conclusions in the science of
wetlands. Although his legal test is that the wetlands must have "significant
nexus," what they must have a significant nexus to is the downstream water
quality of a navigable body of water."3 This principle diverges from the
plurality's requirement of a continuous physical surface connection and is
intended to better reflect the scientific connection between wetlands and
water quality.
To support his conclusion, Justice Kennedy references the
connection between wetlands and water quality as explained in the
scientific and other literature. First, in discussing the basis for the Court's
conclusions in Riverside Bayview, Justice Kennedy cites the Corps' own
regulations for identifying the water quality functions of a wetland that are
lost when it is filled, stating, "in regulatory provisions that remain in effect,
the Corps had concluded that wetlands perform important functions such
as filtering and purifying water draining into adjacent water bodies,
slowing the flow of runoff into lakes, rivers, and streams so as to prevent
flooding and erosion, and providing critical habitat for aquatic animal
species." 137Justice Kennedy goes on to reference the regulations addressing
the filtering and purifying functions when discussing the possible

134. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 279 (cited in Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
785).
135.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 783-87.

136. Id. at 781.
137. Id. at 766 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134-35 (internal citations omitted)).
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importance of wetlands in the removal of toxic pollutants from transport
into navigable waters. 38
In addition, Justice Kennedy cites a technical government report for
the concept that "wetlands play a critical role in controlling and filtering
runoff" 139 and articles from the popular media to point out how the wetland
function of trapping sediment during flood events is important to
downstream water quality and the life of downstream dams.' 40 He notes
that the "act of filling and draining itself may cause the release of nutrients,
toxins, and pathogens that were trapped, neutralized, and perhaps
amenable to filtering or detoxification in the wetlands."' Justice Kennedy
also uses the amici briefs filed in the case to support the scientific basis of
his interpretation of significant nexus, stating that "amici here have noted
that nutrient-rich runoff from the Mississippi River has created a hypoxic,
or oxygen-depleted, 'dead zone' in the Gulf of Mexico that at times
approaches the size of Massachusetts and New Jersey."" 2
Finally, Justice Kennedy explains his reason for rejecting the dissent
by describing it as requiring no connection or "nexus" between a wetland
and the water quality of a navigable water body.' 43 Using the rule of
statutory interpretation that Congress does not insert words into a statute
for no reason,'" Justice Kennedy states that "the dissent reads a central
requirement out -namely, the requirement that the word 'navigable' in
'navigable waters' be given some importance." 45 Justice Kennedy also takes

138. Id. at 774-75.
139. Id. at 777-78 (citing U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-O-206 WETLANDS:
THEIR USE AND REGULATION 43, 48-52 (1984), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
ota/OTA_4/DATA/1984/8433.pdf); RALPH W. TINER, IN SEARCH OF SWAMPLAND: A
WETLAND SOURCEBOOK AND FIELD GUIDE 93-95 (2d ed. 2005); Stefanie L. Whitmire & Stephen
K. Hamilton, Rapid Removal of Nitrate and Sulfate in FreshwaterWetland Sediments, 34 J.ENVTL.
QUALITY 2062 (2005).
140. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 774-75 (citing Henry Fountain, Unloved, But Not Unbuilt,N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2005, at 3; Anthony DePalma, Rebuilding a River Upstate, For the Love of a Tiny
Mussel; Dam to Be Demolished to Save an EndangeredSpecies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 1; A.
Kent MacDougall, DamageCan Be IrreversibleDrought,Floods, Erosion Add to Impactof Tree Loss,
L.A. TIMES, June 19,1987, at 10).
141. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 775 (citing U.S. CONG., OFF. OFTECH. ASSESSMENT, supranote 139,
at 43, 48-52.
142. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 777 (citing Brief for Association of State Wetland Managers et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 21-23, Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Brief for
Environmental Law Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 23, Rapanos,547
U.S. 715 (2006)).
143. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779.
144. GEORGE COSrELLO, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT
TRENDS, at CRS-13 (Cong. Res. Serv. 97-589, updated Mar. 30,2006), availableat http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
145. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 778.
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issue with the Corps regulation that would allow jurisdiction where no
"significant nexus" exists for the same reason."
Justice Kennedy comes the closest among the Rapanos justices to
connecting his legal reasoning to the science of wetlands. Yet his failure to
obtain agreement on his opinion from any other justice suggests that the law
does not require that decisions governing highly technical natural resources
disputes be grounded in science. Furthermore, the fact that Justice
Kennedy's legal approach required articulating a test not found in the
language of the CWA or the agency regulations means that his approach
provides no guidance for resolving disputes in other areas of environmental
or natural resource law.
5. The Dissent of Justice Stevens Joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
In his dissent, Justice Stevens relies on the legal principle of
deference to the regulations of an agency charged with implementing a
technical statute, stating,
In my view, the proper analysis is straightforward. The Army
Corps has determined that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of
traditionally navigable waters preserve the quality of our
Nation's waters by, among other things, providing habitat for
aquatic animals, keeping excessive sediment and toxic
pollutants out of adjacent waters, and reducing downstream
flooding by absorbing water at times of high flow. The Corps'
resulting decision to treat these wetlands as encompassed
within the term "waters of the United States" is a quintessential example of the Executive's reasonable interpretation
of a statutory provision. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
147
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
"Chevron deference," referred to by the name of the case articulating the
standard, is based on the administrative law concept that when Congress
enacts a statute in a highly technical area and delegates authority to an
agency to implement that statute, it intends for the agency to apply its own
scientific expertise to interpret ambiguous terms in the statute."4 The
Chevron case itself addressed another complex environmental law -the
Clean Air Act-and has become one of the most heavily cited cases in
administrative law. 49
Justice Stevens notes that the practical meaning of Chevron
deference in this case is that when faced with the difficult task of drawing

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 779.
Id. at 788.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-45 (1984).
WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 261 (2d ed. 2006).
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a line between an adjacent and an isolated wetland, the agency's judgment
should prevail."i s Justice Stevens further addresses the concern that the
Corps' regulations may be so broad as to encompass wetlands with no
relation to the water quality of the nearby navigable water body by noting
that an assertion of jurisdiction merely requires application for a permit.
The Corps may issue that permit and allow fill to proceed for any wetland
that is not important to the water quality of the waters of the United
States."1
Under the Chevron standard, the Court must still find the agency
interpretation of the statute to be reasonable. 52 Justice Stevens uses many
of the same scientific attributes of wetlands noted by Justice Kennedy to
clarify the meaning of"significant nexus." Thus, Justice Stevens, in rejecting
the plurality's requirement that the water body regulated be relatively
permanent, states that " [i]ntermittent streams can carry pollutants just as
perennial streams can, and their regulation may prove as important for
flood control purposes."' 5 3 Justice Stevens further notes that the wetlands
at issue in Carabell"demonstrate [that a] wetland separated by a berm from
adjacent tributaries may still prove important to downstream water
quality."154 Finally, he notes that fill can be transported downstream and
thereby cause an adverse impact on the water quality and the biological
integrity of the downstream waters.'-'
On its face, deference to an expert agency would appear to be an
excellent strategy for better incorporating scientific understanding into the
law. However, this approach has been subject to growing criticism,
including the argument that once the Court articulated Chevron deference,
agency interpretation itself became infused with political agendas and is
thus suspect.1 6 This growing discontent with the politicization of agencies

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792.
Id.at 794.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 804.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 807 (citing United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 2003), for the
of pollutant transport from tributaries to navigable rivers; U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 43, 48; Don C. Erman & Vernon M. Hawthorne, The Quantitative Importanceof an Intermittent Stream in the Spawning of Rainbow Trout, 105 TRANsACnONS OF
AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y 675-81 (1976); Brief for American Rivers et al. as Amici Curiae at 14 (for
the concept that sediment can cover gravels and thereby impair spawning in both navigable
waters and their tributaries)).
156. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Maritime Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE, CV
05-23-RE, 2005 WL 1278878, at *5 (D.Or. May 26,2005), affd, Columbia Snake River Irrigators
Ass'n v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 230 Fed. Appx. 659 (9th Cir. 2007) (After invalidation of the 2000
BiOp on the Federal Columbia River Power System, rather than addressing the concerns
raised by the district court, the agency, under a new administration, took a completely
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
concept
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and the Court's related discomfort with deference may explain the failure
of Justice Stevens' approach to garner a majority of justices.
A simplistic solution to this problem would be for courts to
distinguish between an agency's scientific determination - where deference
is due-and political maneuvering- where no deference is due. Some
courts have attempted to do this by denying deference where an agency's
"scientific" interpretation changes abruptly with a change in political
administrations. However, in most cases science and policy are legitimately
interwoven in agency decision making.5 7 In this case, the meaning of
"waters of the United States" is not a purely scientific question. The agency
implementing it is constrained by both constitutional law and the scope of
the statutory language. Thus, its interpretation is intricately bound by both
law and science, and some judicial involvement in assessing that
interpretation is inevitable.
6. The Dissent by Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer concurs in the dissent but writes separately to
emphasize two points. First, he agrees with the dissent that deference is
appropriate and seeks to emphasize that "Congress intended the Army
Corps of Engineers to make the complex technical judgments that lie at the
heart of the present cases."" s Second, it is his belief that Congress intended
the jurisdiction of the CWA to extend to the full extent of its constitutional
Commerce Clause powers.15 9 Justice Breyer writes to send a message to the
agency that if it wrote a regulation interpreting "waters of the United
States" to reflect that broad jurisdiction, he believes it would be entitled to
Chevron deference."6

different approach. The district court in the cited case refused to defer under such
circumstances.).
157. See, e.g., Ruh] & Salzman, supra note 36, at 10 (In discussing the need for peer review,
the authors state, "The standard argument that agencies must make policy decisions in the
face of incomplete and uncertain scientific data, and thus should not be bound to the rigors
of peer review, turns the issue on its head. Designed wisely, regulatory peer review can help
reveal how much scientific uncertainty underlies an agency decision and can thus demand
that the agency explain how the gap wasfilled.");Doremus, supra note 7, at 253 ("The core of the
problem is not the involvement of politics but its concealment behind a cloak of science.");
Wagner, supra note 36, at 1617 ("Although camouflaging controversial policy decisions as
science assists the agency in evading various political, legal, and institutional forces, doing
so ultimately delays and distorts the standard-setting mission, leaving in its wake a
dysfunctional regulatory program.").
158. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 811-12. Justice Breyer is the one Justice who has written
specifically about science and the law. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VIcious
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).

159. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 811.
160. Id.
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The basis for Justice Breyer's determination that Congress intended
to exercise the full extent of its Commerce Clause powers in this area draws
on both wetlands science and yet another legitimate legal source for
determining congressional intent: the purpose or goal articulated by
Congress in the statute itself.161 The statutory purpose of the CWA is to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." 162 Justice Breyer draws the connection between this
articulated purpose and the need for the full exercise of relevant Commerce
Clause powers by stating that "Congress might well have decided the only
way to achieve this goal is to write a statute that defines 'waters' broadly
and to leave the enforcing agency with the task of restricting the scope of
that definition, either wholesale through regulation or retail through
development permissions."' 6 Therefore, a broad legal definition is required
to achieve the scientific goals set out by Congress.
Given that each of the five justices writing an opinion in Rapanos
used a legitimate legal methodology to arrive at their differing conclusions,
yet all failed to achieve a result that makes sense from a scientific viewpoint,
the fracturing of the Court in this and other environmental and natural
resource casesMindicates a fundamental underlying problem in the legal
disposition of natural resources disputes. In this case, when the legal
system's goal of achieving finality and establishing a clear bright-line rule
that can be used to resolve future disputes was imposed upon the complex
reality of wetlands science, the end result was neither final nor scientifically
sound. When legitimate legal reasoning makes no scientific sense in an area
infused with science, it is time to reevaluate the underlying legal process.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN NON-IDEAL, COMPLEX SYSTEMS
The problems encountered by the Rapanos Court are common in
environmental and natural resource law. The current gridlock in resolving
environmental disputes within the legal arena ranges from endangered
species' 65 to climate change."6 To characterize this apparent breakdown at

161. Id.
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
163. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 811.
164. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007)
(resulting in the Court splitting 5-4).
165. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration issued its first Federal
Columbia River Power System BiOp in 1992; it was challenged by industry and irrigation
groups but withstood the challenge and lasted for its one-year term. See, e.g., Pac. Nw.
Generating Corp. v. Brown, 822 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Or. 1993) affd, Pac. Nw. Generating Co-op.
v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994) (challenging the 1992 Biological Opinion for the Federal
Columbia River Power System); Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
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the interface between law and science as the result of erroneous legal
reasoning, political maneuvering, or "junk science" merely scratches the
surface and ignores the complexity that emerges when problems occur at
the interface between disciplines. The source of the problem is that the
methodology appropriate for understanding the behavior of a system or
resolving issues within the discipline - either law or science - is no longer
appropriate when addressing issues at the interface. Ultimately, continued
resort to traditional legal forums and methodology for resolving natural
resource disputes will render the judicial system irrelevant for resolving
those problems. 7 since people will only expend so many resources on failed
efforts before they turn to other methods. The need to alter our approach in
a way that accounts for the complexity, uncertainty, and non-ideal behavior
that occurs at the intersection between law and natural science is not limited
to the judicial realm, but must begin with the drafting of laws and
implementation by agencies.
A. Congress: The Drafting of Laws
An obvious answer to the problem encountered by the courts in
Rapanos is better bill drafting by Congress. If Congress used terms with
defined scientific meaning to describe the scope of regulation intended
under the CWA, litigation would be reduced. If, for example, Congress
defined "waters of the United States" not only expressly but also in the
context of the scientific understanding of hydrologic connections, it would
eliminate the need for litigation over this definition.1"
Two barriers exist to this simple answer. First, neutral scientific
advice to Congress is lacking. In 1995, Congress withdrew funding for the

850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994) (successfully challenging the 1993 Biological Opinion for the
Federal Columbia River Power System); Am. Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV
96-384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *10 (D. Or. 1997) (challenging the 1994 Biological Opinion
for the Federal Columbia River Power System); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003) (successfully challenging the 2000 Biological Opinion
for the Federal Columbia River Power System); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Maritime
Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE 2005 WL 1278878, at *5 (D. Or., 2005) affd,
Columbia Snake River Irrigators Ass'n v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 230 Fed. Appx. 659 (9th Cir.
2007) (successfully challenging the 2005 Biological Opinion for the Federal Columbia River
Power System).
166. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
167. While it might also be argued that scientific methodology must also be reformed to
better integrate social and political systems, this article focuses on reform within the legal
system.
168. This does not mean that, by acknowledging hydrologic connection, Congress must
protect connected waters, simply that it be express about whether it intends that protection
or not.
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Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the nonpartisan technical advisory
office for Congress. In the farewell page on OTA's website, the concern of
the parting scientist is implied in the following statement: "For 23 years, the
nonpartisan analytical agency assisted Congress with the complex and
highly technical issues that increasingly affect our society."' 69 With the
increasing complexity of environmental and natural resource issues facing
society, it is nothing short of foolish for Congress to limit its technical advice
to lobbyists and partisan staff. Restoring funding to OTA would be an
important first step in improving bill drafting.
However, many federal statutes that are now the subject of intense
litigation over their meaning were drafted during the time OTA was
operational. This raises the second barrier to improved bill drafting:
Congress. Clarity in bill drafting is frequently sacrificed for bill passage.17
Ambiguity may simply be the only means to obtain agreement on a law
when there is no underlying agreement among a majority of members about
what the goals of the law and the powers of the enforcing agency should be.
Despite the bleak outlook for clearer and more scientifically
grounded legislation, another potential avenue for improvement remains.
To date, we have failed to learn as much as we could from the implementation of environmental laws over the past 30 years. Consider the statement
of one agency scientist struggling with the implementation of the CWA
between SWANCC and Rapanos:
A number of studies have examined the hydrologic and
water-quality function of isolated wetlands ....
Most of this
information describes how individual or local groups of
wetlands function. Studies are needed that examine how
isolated wetlands contribute to regional hydrology or water
quality and the extent to which these functions are influenced
by isolation. 1
This absence of data is troubling after roughly 30 years of implementation.
Yet, it is hardly the fault of the agency. Congress rarely approves or funds
the monitoring of results from the implementation of a law. It seems at first
glance a waste of money: merely a way for scientists to collect more data to
play with or a purely academic exercise. But consider the costs that could
be saved by taxpayers and the regulated community if we were to improve

169. Off. of Tech. Assessment, August 1996 OTA Archive, http://www.gpo.gov/ota/
(last visited June 29, 2007).
170. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 12, at 24 ("Congress has shown no interest in facing
up to the political costs of making these choices explicitly. It is more politically advantageous
to declare aspirational goals in ringing terms, but leave the implementing agencies with the
hard task of determining the extent to which those goals will be achieved." (citation omitted)).
171. Leibowitz, supra note 60, at 521 (citations omitted).
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agency decision making over time. One way in which regulatory science
differs from research science is that, since the regulatory research agenda
is set by the political process rather than by the scientist, regulatory science
misses opportunities to build a body of knowledge that will result in this
improved decision making. Although resources are too scarce to monitor
all aspects of implementation, targeting areas in which scientific and policy
choices must be made to fill data gaps would be a start toward improving
understanding of how law, science, and policy interact.
The targeted monitoring recommended above must be incorporated
into bill drafting in two ways. First, environmental legislation must require
monitoring of results, particularly in areas of scientific uncertainty and
controversy. Second, environmental legislation must delegate authority to
agencies, within specified parameters, to adapt their implementation based
on the results of this monitoring. Only through this adaptive process' 72 can
the implementation of environmental legislation evolve into more efficient
and effective regulation over time. This brings us to the work of the agency.
B. Agency Decision Making
The environmental and natural resource problems we face are
increasingly the subject of complicated and lengthy statutes delegating
implementation to agencies with scientific expertise. The Rapanos case, for
example, involves the Clean Water Act and its extensive delegation of
regulatory authority to the EPA and the Corps of Engineers. Such large,
scientifically staffed agencies were developed in response to the increasing
complexity of the nation's environmental and natural resource problems
and the solutions created to address those problems. 173 Reliance on the
agencies' scientific expertise is exactly what Congress had in mind when it
started down the environmental regulatory path. 74 However, problems
arise when the power to affect people's lives or livelihoods is delegated to
an agency using methods no layperson can understand. In the sheer
complexity of the issues, the transparency we have come to expect of
government action is sacrificed. It is unsurprising that in the face of such
inaccessibility, those affected resort to the judicial system. If any of the
methods suggested below for improving how the judiciary handles

172. This may resemble what has been referred to as adaptive management. See, e.g., Janet
C. Neuman, Adaptive Management: How Water Law Needs to Change, 31 ENVrL. L. REP. 11,432
(2001) (discussing the need to introduce flexible "adaptive" management into the prior

appropriation system). However, it is intended here to encompass broader parameters for
monitoring, including relevant social changes.
173. See, e.g., Jack Lewis, TheBirth ofEPA, EPAJ., Nov. 1985,availableathttp://www.epa.
gov/history/topics/epa/15c.htm.
174. Id.
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scientific issues are to succeed, parallel changes to agency development of
the scientific record must occur.
Two main problems arise regarding the use of science by agencies
implementing environmental and natural resource laws:"7s (1) scientific
uncertainty: the timeline and subject matter of regulatory implementation
dictates that decisions be made in the face of imperfect knowledge and
substantial data gaps176 or the science needed for implementation may be
relatively new and untested' 77 and (2) regulatory science or science-policy:
the agency often makes policy choices to fill data gaps, but those choices
may either be deliberately hidden under a cloak of science to be afforded
deference, or so thoroughly intermeshed with choices based7 on science that
separating the science from the policy may be impossible. 8
1. Scientific Uncertainty
The fact that there are no absolute answers to most questions
involving the study of natural systems should come as no surprise after the
discussion of complexity. Natural systems occur at the interface between
multiple scientific disciplines and between the so-called hard and soft
sciences. Except for the most simplistic critics of agency science, most
scholars recognize that scientific uncertainty cannot be entirely eliminated

175. Much has been written about the good science/bad science debate and the
Information Quality Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2000). See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the
"Junk Science" Law: Reforming the InformationQualityAct, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 37 (2006); O'Reilly,
supranote 35. Because it is the author's opinion that this is primarily a political debate and act,
and the courts remain the appropriate forum for challenge to agency action, it will not be
discussed in the context of this article.
176. See, e.g., Doremus & Tarlock supra note 12; Johnson, supra note 175, at 47 ("As
academics have frequently noted, there are, and have always been important gaps in the
information that the government needs in order to make decisions to protect health, safety,
and the environment."); Ruhl, supra note 30, at 8; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 36; Sidney A.
Shapiro, OMB and the Politicizationof Risk Assessment 3 (draft paper prepared for Law, Science
and the Environment Conference, Lewis and Clark Law School, 2007), http://www.lclark.
edu/dept/elaw/2007-lse-papers.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2008); Wagner, supra note 36, at
1619.
177. Shapiro, supra note 176, at 5-6.
178. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 7, at 253; Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound
Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-based Strategiesfor Avoiding Accountability and
ResponsibilityforRisk-ProducingProductsand Activities, 52 U. KAN.L. REV. 897,932 (2004); Ruhl
&Salzman, supranote 36, at 20; Wagner, supranote 36 ("Although camouflaging controversial
policy decisions as science assists the agency in evading various political, legal, and
institutional forces, doing so ultimately delays and distorts the standard-setting mission,
leaving in its wake a dysfunctional regulatory program.").
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and its presence is not a result of bad science or failure on the part of the
7
agency."
Generally, discussions about the challenge of decision making in
the face of uncertainty focus on the use of policy to fill gaps, as discussed
below; thus, how gaps are filled is considered a legal rather than scientific
issue.' 8° However, researchers in sciences that work at the interface between
disciplines, particularly those in the environmental and natural resource
sciences, are never able to fill all the gaps with data. Although aggravated
by the tight deadlines agencies often face, this is a fundamental aspect of the
scientific study of complex, non-ideal systems. Data gaps are filled by resort
to scientific judgment as part of the scientific process, and this gap-filling
does not become a policy decision rather than a part of the scientific
methodology simply by virtue of the fact that it is made in a regulatory
setting.
2. Regulatory Science or Science Policy
The scientific method used in agency decision making differs both
fundamentally and necessarily from what we think of as academic research
science because it takes place in a forum where policy and social need are
taken into consideration; where the problem is identified and defined
outside the agency (frequently by Congress) and, as a result, may not be a

179. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 175, at 47-48 ("As academics have frequently noted,
there are, and have always been, important gaps in the information that the government
needs in order to make decisions to protect health, safety, and the environment."); Wagner,
supra note 36, at 1619; see also Doremus & Tarlock, supranote 12, at 3; Ruhl, supra note 30, at
8; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 36; Shapiro, supra note 176, at 3.
180. Shapiro, supra note 176, at 3 ("The ultimate question of whether an agency has
sufficient proof that a statutory risk trigger has been met is a legal, not a scientific, issue. It is
a legal issue, in part, because Congress intended agencies to make regulatory decisions on the
basis of imperfect knowledge. Agencies therefore do not conform to scientific standards of
certainty. As Judge Skelly Wright once explained, 'Agencies are not limited to scientific facts,
to 95% certainties.' This means an agency determination that there is sufficient evidence to
satisfy a risk trigger can be legally valid even if the scientific community does not universally
agree about the degree of risk that exists." (citations omitted)). See also Ruhl & Salzman, supra
note 36. In recommending a different kind of peer review for agency science, Ruhl and
Salzman state, "regulatory peer review can help inform the public about where an agency's
use of science in support of a proposed decision ends and where its use of professional
judgment and normative policy choices begins." Id. at 20-21 ("Whether innocent or deliberate,
this kind of misuse of science does not necessarily lead to poor policy decisions. After all,
agencies may have no choice but to extrapolate from incomplete data when a decision needs
to be made at that moment. It can raise concerns, however, if an agency justifies its decision
to the public, courts, and legislature as being driven chiefly by the science when it is in fact
based on a policy judgment informed by inconclusive science."); Doremus & Tarlock, supra
note 12, at 3 ("Typically, the disputes are fundamentally about how incomplete data are interpreted and applied, rather than about what the data are or how they have been gathered.").
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purely scientific question; 8' and where agency scientists generally synthesize information obtained by other scientists rather than collecting data
themselves. 82 As discussed above, it is common for scientists to use
judgment to fill data gaps in the complex sciences. However, what differs
in the regulatory setting is that the exercise of scientific judgment may be
influenced one way or the other by social or political considerations. 83 In
some cases, the direction agency scientists must take when faced with
uncertainty is dictated by Congress. In fact, there is evidence that Congress
has been fully aware of the need for gap filling when it delegates authority
to agencies and intends for the agency to use judgment that may not be
based on science to fill the gaps."8 Thus,
the Clean Air Act [requires] that EPA set National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, "allowing an adequate margin of
safety [that is] requisite to protect the public health"; and in
the Clean Water Act's Total Maximum Daily Load provision,
[the EPA is directed] to set TMDLs with "a margin of safety
which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning
the relationship between effluent limitations and water
quality." 8 '
Thus, law, agency policy, and scientific judgment may all play a role in
reaching a single decision. Separating them for the sake of transparency, as
recommended by some,"' may not be so easily done. 87

181. Wagner, supra note 36, at 1619 (quoting nuclear physicist Alvin Weinberg, who refers
to "trans-science" as "questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be
answered by science").
182. See, e.g., Ruh] & Salzman, supra note 36, at 6 ("Just as scientific peer review involves
independent evaluation of scientific research, regulatory peer review refers to the outside
evaluation of an administrative agency's compilation, selection, or use of scientific data to
support a proposed regulatory decision such as a rule, standard, permit, or other policy.").
183. McGarity, supra note 178, at 932 ("The courts must also recognize that the policyrelevant conclusions of scientific studies are never based exclusively upon science. Policy
considerations frequently have an impact on interpretations of raw scientific data. More
importantly, policy nearly always drives the inferences that an expert draws from scientific
studies." (citations omitted)).
184. See Shapiro, supra note 176.
185. Doremus & Tarlock, supranote 12, at 24 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000)).
186. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 36, at 10. In discussing the need for peer review,
the authors state,
The standard argument that agencies must make policy decisions in the face
of incomplete and uncertain scientific data, and thus should not be bound
to the rigors of peer review, turns the issue on its head. Designed wisely,
regulatory peer review can help reveal how much scientific uncertainty
underlies an agency decision and can thus demand that the agency explain
how the gap was filled.
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Nevertheless, most scholars recommend some sort of requirement
that the agency articulate the degree of uncertainty and explain how gaps
were filled.'" Ruhl and Salzman recommend a different kind of peer
review, which they refer to as "regulatory peer review," to resolve this
problem.'89 Whereas traditional peer review evaluates research in which
original data are collected and analyzed, regulatory peer review evaluates
how an agency makes use of data and studies done elsewhere and how data
gaps were filled to reach a decision."9° Although this approach may be
helpful in certain circumstances, particularly where high levels of
controversy exist,19' it is just as easy to bias a science review panel as it is an

Id. See also Doremus, supra note 7, at 253 ("The core of the problem is not the involvement of
politics but its concealment behind a cloak of science."); Wagner, supra note 36, at 1617
("Although camouflaging controversial policy decisions as science assists the agency in
evading various political, legal, and institutional forces, doing so ultimately delays and
distorts the standard-setting mission, leaving in its wake a dysfunctional regulatory
program.").
187. Ruhl, supra note 30, at 8 ("Rather, I suggest we accept that science will never
completely answer the questions posed in the ESA, that agencies inevitably are making
decisions in a chaotic world in which information is never adequate to provide certainty, and
questions about policy and science blur together.").
188. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 7, at 290. Doremus states,
Political choices cannot be removed from the process. Instead of trying to
remove them, it would be more helpful to focus on making the political
elements of these decisions more transparent. At the moment, the
determinative points in the decision making process tend to be hidden from
public view, so that the public never has the opportunity to untangle the
contributions of career scientists and political appointees to the ultimate
decision. That can allow decisions that are in fact primarily political to be
disguised as scientific ones.
Id. (citations omitted).
189. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 36, at 10. The authors summarize their idea of "regulatory
peer review" as follows:
When focused on the latter inquiry-the question of whether the agency's
claims of scientific support for its decision are justified -regulatory peer
review can help inform the public about where an agency's use of science in
support of a proposed decision ends and where its use of professional
judgment and normative policy choices begins.
Id. See also Shapiro, supra note 176, at 10.
190. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 36, at 10 (In recommending a different kind of peer
review for agency science, the authors state, "regulatory peer review can help inform the
public about where an agency's use of science in support of a proposed decision ends and
where its use of professional judgment and normative policy choices begins.").
191. J.B. Ruhl's experience with regulatory review was as a participant on a review panel
of the scientific basis for a jeopardy opinion on operation of a Reclamation project in the
Klamath basin, a particularly acrimonious issue. Id. n.8.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

agency's management.192 Use of specialized district courts described below
as the avenue for review would provide a forum to review these types of
questions. In addition, the development of a record by the agency
describing its decision-making process in light of uncertainty would
facilitate this review.
C. The Judiciary
1. Choosing a Model
The complexity of dispute resolution in the environmental and
natural resource arena requires a forum in which knowledge of law and
science can be integrated. The traditional judicial model in which part of the
required neutrality of the third-party judge stems from lack of knowledge
in the substantive area will no longer work. 193 Acting alone, the judicial
system will not only fail to achieve results that optimize human use of
natural resources, but will also fail to achieve the more limited goal of
finality as decisions lacking a scientific grounding will drive interest groups
to other forums for solutions. Knowledge of more than legal process is
required to sort through the complex problems in which science and
scientific uncertainty dominate.
To understand complex systems, scientists frequently turn to
models that allow analysis of the interrelation between multiple variables.
High speed computing has provided a valuable tool for examining complex
scientific problems with multiple variables and degrees of uncertainty
through the development of models. Law and policy are not so readily
examined through this quantitative, binary method.194 Yet legal processes,

192. See generally McGarity, supra note 178, at 897; see also Shapiro, supra note 176, at 7
("Regulatory science can also be politicized when an administrator stacks scientific advisory
panels with scientists whose previous work or professional orientation indicates they will
resolve ambiguous scientific issues in a manner friendly to the administrator's policy
preferences.").
193. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Reinvigoratingthe Union of Wonder and Power, 24 VA. ENvrL.
L.J. 281, 282-83 (2005).
The basic structure of our legal institutions was established long before we
understood the nature of environmental problems, indeed long before we
recognized such a category of problems. The design of those institutions is
at best an awkward fit for environmental problems. The institutions are
highly fragmented, while the problems they are supposed to solve cross
boundaries almost gleefully, spilling from one parcel or one political
jurisdiction to another, migrating from air to water to land, and infiltrating
even the largest protected areas.

Id.
194. As noted above, monitoring the results of a particular law or policy and using those
results to improve implementation can, in certain circumstances, be quantified and modeled.
Models that take a systems approach may be particularly useful in this effort, but are beyond
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too, can be modeled. Legal models use language rather than numbers. A

legal model tends to provide a general framework that can be adapted to
specific situations. Nevertheless, there are several important similarities in
the process of selecting appropriate quantitative and legal models.
First, similar to, for example, a hydrologic model of a water basin,
the best legal model for a particular situation is of the appropriate scale or
easily adapted to the scale of the problem. 95 Some legal models are so
adaptable that they can be scaled up or down to fit the need. For example,
the model of three coequal branches of government set forth by the U.S.
Constitution has proven successful at the national scale, and also at the
scales of state and tribal governments. Other legal models that were
developed with a specific problem in mind are not so easily adapted to a

problem of a different scale.'96
Second, because of the complexity of both the real system and the
model, the best model is one in which at least some of the component parts
have been tested in similar situations.' 97 The process of adapting the model
to a new situation must include an effort to analyze the effectiveness of
prior tests and to modify the model accordingly. In addition, the model
must be sufficiently general to allow its adaptation to issues ranging from
water quality to endangered species.
Finally, just as many in the legal and policy communities criticize
scientists for ignoring legal, social, and political reality in their approach to
problem solving, 198 the best legal model cannot ignore social and political
reality by assuming an overly "ideal" system. Should the model ignore the
fact that institutional changes in a democracy are slow and incremental, that
the cost of developing new forums for dispute resolution must be
minimized, and that the neutrality so important to a judicial system

the scope of this article. See generally ANDREW

FORD, MODELING THE ENVIRONMENT: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELING OF ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS (1999).
195. Barbara Cosens, The Role of Hydrology in the Resolution of Water Disputes,J.CONTEMP.
WATER RES. & EDUC., May 2006, at 17.

196. For example, The Utton Transboundary Resources Center at the University of New
Mexico recently sponsored a study that resulted in the production of a Model Interstate Water
Compact, available at http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/model-compacts.html (last visited Aug.
29, 2007). Although extremely useful on the scale of the type of setting that led to the
project - a multi-state, variable climate, surface water dominated system like the Colorado
River-the model is of only limited use for a small interstate basin with a relatively
homogenous economy and climate that is dominated by groundwater sources such as the
Palouse Basin shared by Washington and Idaho. The Palouse Basin is part of ongoing research
by the author and a multidisciplinary team focused on developing case studies for use in the
University of Idaho's new graduate program in Water Resources.
197. Cosens, supra note 195.
198. For some reason, we tend to refer to this as being too "academic," whereas my guess
would be that scientists refer to it as an "ideal" world.
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established primarily on process cannot be sacrificed when substance is
introduced, it will be a model of purely academic usefulness. 199
With these points in mind, the following discussion uses the
Colorado water court system as a model forum for natural resources dispute resolution that could be adapted for use in the federal district court
system to accommodate complexity in environmental and natural resource
dispute resolution. 2 ° Parallel modifications within state court systems could
follow if the experiment is considered successful.
2. The Colorado Water Court System as a Model
The current Colorado water court system was created by the Water
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 (1969 Act).201 The 1969
Act designates seven divisions corresponding to the major water basins in
the state.2 2 Each division has a water court within the state district court
system and one district court judge selected to preside. Water judges may
hear non-water related cases in their roles as district court judges, but they
are the only judges within the division to hear water cases. In addition to
the water judge, each water court has a district engineer, a water clerk, and
a referee. While the water judge is assigned the role of determining water
rights, resolving water use disputes, and hearing requests for changes in
use,' the referee, who has the status of a magistrate and is appointed by
the water judge,2° first investigates and attempts to settle filed cases.2"5 Of
particular importance in this process is the fact that, in general, referees

199. A pilot project initiated by the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) and the American Bar Association is underway to allow selection of an expert or
panel of experts for a court to rely on for scientific matters. See Justice Stephen G. Breyer, The
Interdependence of Science and Law, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY YEARBOOK (AAAS
1999), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/yearbook/chap9.htm (last visited Nov. 28,
2007); Mark S. Frankel, The Role of Science in Making Good Decisions (AAAS Testimony
before the House Committee on Science, June 10, 1998), available at http://www.aaas.org/
spp/sfrl/projects/testim/mftest.htm (last visited Nov. 28,2007); H.R. COMM. ON SCI., 105TH
CONGRESS, UNLOCKING OUR FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY § IV.E, at
54-55 (Comm. Print 105-B 1998). However, this approach seems more suited to science
matters that arise in criminal cases and certain civil cases such as product liability. In the vast
realm of review of regulatory action, this approach may not only lack the uniformity and cost
effectiveness necessary for implementation, but also may fail to provide the integrated legalscientific solutions made possible by the recommendation set forth in the following text.
200. This article focuses on changes to the federal district court system. To the extent that
challenges to federal agency action in the environment and natural resources area go directly
to the D.C. Circuit Court, the same recommendations apply.
201. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-201 (West 2004).
202. Id. § 37-92-201(1).
203. Id. § 37-92-203.
204. Id. § 37-92-203(4).
205. Id. § 37-92-203(7).
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have both science and legal training. 2°6 Justice Hobbs of the Colorado
Supreme Court estimates that 95 percent of the cases filed are settled by the
referees.2' If a case is not settled, the referee submits a report to the water
208
judge, and those cases are heard de novo.
In addition to the expert referee, the water judge also has a division
engineer on staff.2' The 1969 Act separates water administration from the
adjudication of water rights by the water court. Administration is done by
the state engineer through his or her division engineers. 210 The referee may
turn to the division engineer for consultation on cases, 211 and the division
engineer may appear before the water judge as an expert. In turn, it is the
responsibility of the water judge to issue any injunction necessary to carry
out the administrative orders of the State Engineer.212 Finally, the water
court is also assigned a clerk to maintain water court records.2 3
Analyses of the effectiveness of the Colorado water court system
have concluded that it has encouraged "expertise, sophistication, and
innovation in water management." 214 The system not only provides water
judges with access to neutral technical expertise, it also allows these judges
to develop their own expertise over time.21 5 In addition, it has been
observed that the designation of a particular judge to preside over water
cases has led to greater consistency in district court level rulings on water
disputes.216
Certain aspects of the Colorado water court system provide a useful
template for the development of a dispute resolution forum for federal
environmental and natural resources cases. First, the inclusion of the water
court system within the existing district court system provides for ease of
administration and docketing of cases and avoids creating any new or
separate level within the judiciary. Applying this to the federal district court
system, the designated judge with a small environment and natural
resource docket would continue to hear other cases before the district court,
and the designation of an area of specialty would not result in any

206. Id. § 37-92-203(6). See MARILYN C. O'LEARY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE COLORADO WATER
COURT SYSTEM 18 (prepared for the Office of the N.M. State Engineer, 2003, through the Utton

Transboundary Res. Ctr., Univ. of New Mexico School of Law), availableat http://uttoncenter.
unm.edu/pdfs/ColoradoWaterCourts.pdf.
207. O'LEARY, supra note 206, at 17.
208. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-303 (West 2004).
209. Id. § 37-92-202.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. § 37-92-503.
213. Id. § 37-92-204.
214. O'LEARY, supra note 206.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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reduction of case management efficiency. Conversely, a district with a
heavy environment and natural resource docket could seek appointment of
more than one judge to this area.
Second, the selection of referees with expertise in relevant areas of
science and law provides the Colorado district water judges with neutral
technical expertise. In the federal district court system, judges' access to
neutral scientific information is hampered by the fact that scientific studies
based on field data may not meet the current federal standard for
admissibility due to their lack of replicability and high levels of
uncertainty. 217For example, in the environment and natural resource fields,
just because a particular field methodology is appropriate within the
discipline and has received peer review does not mean that two different
scientists applying the same approach to the same locale will reach the same
conclusions. The number of variables and degree of uncertainty in the
measurement of each variable and its interaction with others is simply too
great. As discussed above, scientists routinely exercise their judgment in the
face of such uncertainty. However, when science becomes the basis of a
case, judgments will frequently be governed by the desired end result - i.e.,
the result most favorable to the expert's client. Although most "science
advocacy 218 remains within the range of credible scientific outcomes, a
judge has little guidance on how to choose between two sets of scientific
assumptions made by opposing parties. Traditional legal methodology such
as deference to the agency or placement of the burden of proof may resolve
the immediate case, but if it results in a scientifically inadequate solution,
the dispute will resume. Neutral technical advice can help a judge sort

217. The current federal standard is articulated in Daubertv. MerrillDow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579,580 (1993). In Daubert,the Court relaxed the former standard for admission
of scientific evidence in court, which had required general acceptance in the particular
scientific field, and instead articulated four non-exclusive factors to be applied by the trial
court judge acting as gatekeeper. The factors are (1) the "theory or technique... can be (and has
been) tested"; (2) the "theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication";
(3) a "known or potential error rate" has been determined; and (4) the technique has "widespread acceptance" in the particular area of science. See also Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme
Court'sTrilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EvIDENcE 72 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed., West 1994).
218. This term has been used in a variety of ways both to indicate representation of a client
and to indicate distortion of the scientific methods. See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson, Science
Advocacy and Scientific Due Process,16 IssuES INScI. & TECH., Summer 2000, at 71,74; William
Stelle, Jr., Overcoming the Seven Myths of Columbia River Salmon Recovery, 28 ENVTL. L. 493,499
(1998) (" [A]genda-driven science advocacy continues to color the debate, and to cloud the
underlying policy issues that lie at the core of salmon recovery in the Basin."); Margaret A.
Shannon et al., Science Advocacy Is Inevitable: Deal with It, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIEY OF
AMERICAN FORESrERS ANNUAL CONFERENCE (1996).
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through scientific evidence and increase the likelihood that science
advocacy will be distinguished from scientific judgment.
Third, the use of referees in the Colorado water courts to investigate
the case and facilitate settlement has reduced the court's docket and
provided a forum for creative solutions backed by court oversight to ensure
consistency. This is a method already familiar to the federal judicial system.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long used special masters to resolve interstate
water disputes.219 In those disputes, the report and recommendations of the
special master are filed with the Supreme Court.220 The parties may file
objections and the Court considers the objections with reference to the
report of the special master. 221 Application of this approach to
environmental and natural resource disputes at the district court level
would both elevate the degree of neutral technical analysis and promote
discussion of the types of solutions often found only in settlement.' The
increasing resort to settlement of Indian water rights is attributed, in part,
to the ability to craft physical solutions that minimize impact and maximize
benefit to all parties.2 Yet the settlement process is ad hoc and depends on
the financial ability of the parties to establish a forum. 224 A court-organized
settlement process for federal environmental disputes would create a forum
more accessible to all and increase opportunities for creative solutions.
Finally, by designating a particular judge within each district court
to handle specific types of natural resources cases, even judges without
scientific backgrounds will be able to gain expertise in the area. In the
Colorado water court system, appointment is by the state supreme court for
one-year terms.2 However, most terms are renewed repeatedly, resulting
in highly experienced water judges. 226 Enhancing this growth of expertise
is the fact that western water judges and special masters have developed a
forum for continuing education on the procedural and substantive issues

219.

See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 551 (1963).

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. For example, settlement has become a highly favored approach in Indian water right
disputes because results often lead to development of infrastructure and administrative
processes. See generally TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: ESSAYS INCONTEMPORARY LAW, POLICY, AND
EcoNOMIcs (John E. Thorson et al. eds., 2006); NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS (Bonnie
G. Colby et al. eds., 2005).
223. Barbara Cosens, Water Dispute Resolution in the West: Process Elements for the Modern
Era in Basin-wide Problem Solving, 33 ENVTL. L. 949 (2003); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 755
(1984).
224. Cosens, supranote 223, at 949.
225. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(2) (West 2004).
226. O'LEARY, supra note 206, at 19.
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addressed in water cases. 2 7 In recent years, the forum has included
workshops on scientific issues. Another novel feature of the forum is that
the participants agree in advance that all discussions are to be confidential,
which allows judges to discuss particular issues currently before them. A
similar forum for continuing education for designated environmental and
natural resource judges in the federal court system would be valuable both
for facilitating a dialogue among these judges and for enhancing judicial
expertise.
Two elements of the Colorado water court system are not
recommended for a federal environmental and natural resource system.
Both have to do with the difference between the relative roles of the state
court and the Colorado State Engineer, as compared to those of the
federal courts and agencies.
Even before the 1969 Water Distribution and Administration Act,
Colorado divided authority over water rights between the courts and the
State Engineer. Determinations of water rights and changes in water rights
were to be done in district court, while administration and water measurement were to be done by the State Engineer. By contrast, most western
states have adopted permit systems that allow for an initial administrative
determination of new water rights without having to go through the court
system. 229 Criticism of the Colorado approach includes the high cost of
hiring experts and lawyers to assert a water right in court.23°An administrative permit system is less costly and less formal and therefore more
accessible to those with fewer resources.231
In the federal context, an extensive administrative system is already
established - and for good reason, given the highly technical nature of
implementation.232 In addition, the scientific subject matter is much more

227. Information on Dividing the Waters can be found at http://www.dividingthewaters.
org/. "Dividing the Waters is a collaboration of a network of judges, special masters and
referees who preside over western water adjudications and other complex water litigation."
Id. The project seeks to "improve the management and outcome of general stream adjudications and other complex water-related litigation affecting western people and the region's
environment." Id. The project serves state trial judges, state appellate judges, federal trial and
appellate judges, and U.S. Supreme Court special masters. Id.
228. The State Engineer's office in Colorado was established in 1881 and is within the
Division of Water Resources of the Department of Natural Resources. See http://water.
state.co.us/.
229. See, e.g., IDAHOCODEANN. § 42-201(4) (2006) (amended 2008) (requiring a permit for
appropriation of water); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-301(1) (2007) (same); WASH. REV. CODE §
90.03.250 (2008) (same).
230. O'LEARY, supra note 206, at 17.

231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) (requiring the EPA to set effluent
limitations for point source discharges); id. § 1313 (requiring the EPA to review state water
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diverse than water allocation. Thus, it remains appropriate that federal
environmental or natural resource agencies act in the first instance prior to
consideration of an issue by a specialized branch of the federal district court
system.
In addition, since this means that many of the challenges that reach
the federal district court system will be challenges to agency action or
efforts at agency enforcement, it would be inappropriate to also have
agency personnel on the court staff. Rather than placing agency personnel
on court staff, it may be appropriate to address the range of potential media
with the appointment of referees with specialized areas -e.g., air, water,
endangered species, toxics, etc. Finally, the development of an agency
record delineating science and policy choices, as discussed above, and
improved decision making through monitoring and adjusted implementation can only be accomplished within a system in which the decisions in the
first instance lie with the agency.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our failure to account for the complexity of the intersection
between human and natural systems in legal disputes involving natural
resources threatens to render that system irrelevant if it cannot adapt. The
inability of the U.S. Supreme Court to achieve a majority opinion in Rapanos
v. United States and, of even greater concern, the failure of any of the
opinions in that case to provide meaningful guidance to the scientists who
must implement the Clean Water Act illustrates the current breakdown at
the interface between law and science. Addressing the complexity at that
interface requires reforming the legal process used to resolve these disputes.
The appointment of specific federal district court judges to address
environmental and natural resource disputes and the addition of neutral
scientists and settlement masters to the court's staff would provide an initial
step toward developing a more appropriate method for natural resource
dispute resolution.

quality standards); id. § 1314 (requiring the EPA to develop water quality criteria); see also
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408,7409 (2000) (requiring the EPA to establish air quality criteria
for certain pollutants); id. § 7410 (requiring the EPA to review state implementation plans);
id. § 7411 (requiring the EPA to establish standards of performance for new stationary sources
of air pollutants).

